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The Inference to the Best Legal Explanation 
Claudio Michelon* 
 
Legal Argumentation, Inference to the Best Explanation, Legal Abduction, 
Legal Principle, Inferential forms  
 
Courts use inferences to the best explanation in many contexts and for a 
variety of purposes. Yet our understanding of lawyers’ uses of this inferential 
form is insufficient. In this article, after briefly introducing this inferential 
form, I set out (i) to explain the structure of such arguments by reference to an 
argument scheme; (ii) to clarify the types of claims courts support by 
deploying such inferences while attempting to justify acting in accordance 
with explanatory principles (inferences I shall refer to as IBE-P); (iii) to offer 
an account of the “explanatory” relationship on which IBE-P is predicated; 
(iv) to explain what precisely can count as part of the explanandum in an IBE-
P and, finally (v) discuss criteria that might be used to adjudicate which is the 
best among rival explanations. 
 
 
In Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale ltd, Lord Goff of Chieveley deals with the 
question of whether the defendant has a change of position defence opposable to the 
plaintiff’s action for money had and received.1 He acknowledges that whether or not 
                                                 
* Professor of Philosophy of Law, Edinburgh Law School. I am grateful to Luís Duarte d’Almeida for 
discussion on early drafts of this article and for comments by Eveline Feteris, John Gardner, Jaap 
Hage, Euan MacDonald, Neil Walker, and two anonymous OJLS referees. Earlier versions were 
presented at the Universities of Edinburgh, Maastricht, Pará, and Pompeo Fabra and the discussion in 
each of those occasions had a clear and positive impact on the final product.  
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this defence ‘is or should be recognised [in English Law] as a defence to claims in 
restitution is a subject which has been much debated in the books’.2 He also claims 
that there is consensus that the defence should be recognised in English law and 
vehemently adheres to that consensus3. 
But there is a difficulty, as ‘the defence has received at most only partial 
recognition in English law’ 4. He goes on to identify two groups of cases whose 
decisions can be said to rest upon a change of position defence:  
 (1) where an agent can defeat a claim to restitution on the ground that, before 
learning of the plaintiff's claim, he has paid the money over to his principal or 
otherwise altered his position in relation to his principal on the faith of the 
payment (the “Good Faith Agent” Norm); and (2) certain cases concerned 
with bills of exchange, in which money paid under forged bills has been held 
irrecoverable on grounds which may, on one possible view, be rationalised in 
terms of change of position (the “Forged Bills of Exchange” Norm).5 
 
Lord Goff also claims that, in other situations in which change-of-position-
type facts arose, ‘it has been usual to approach the problem as one of estoppel’ but 
argues that ‘in many cases estoppel is not an appropriate concept to deal with 
the problem.’6 Estoppel’s insufficiency to cover all the relevant cases would betray 
the need for a general principle, in English Law, allowing a defence of change of 
position. As Lord Goff puts it ‘[t]he time for its recognition in this country is, in my 
                                                                                                                                           
1 [1991] 2 AC 548.  
2 ibid 578. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid at [G]. 
5 ibid 578-579. 
6 ibid 579 at [B]-[E]. 
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opinion, long overdue’7. 
In support of his conclusion, Lord Goff enlists a number of different 
arguments. He uses comparative material as persuasive authority, he draws on 
scholarly consensus, and he resorts to legal policy considerations. One of these 
arguments performs a crucial role in legitimizing his decision and, accordingly, 
commands most of his attention in the opinion, namely, an inference to the best 
explanation to the effect that the defence of change of position is the best way to 
make sense of a collection of legal sources and the norms they contain (in particular 
(a) the two groups of cases mentioned above, (b) some cases that are normally dealt 
with by reference to estoppel, and (c) Lord Mansfield’s (broad) obiter statements in 
Moses v Macferlan).8 
Yet, claiming that Lord Goff used an inference to the best explanation to 
support his conclusion is not very illuminating, given how little clarity we have about 
this inferential form, in particular when used by lawyers. Literature on the use of 
inferences to the best explanation in legal contexts has developed in two fronts: (i) the 
study of its use in the assessment and/or evaluation of judicial evidence9 and (ii) the 
inferences made in support of legal principles10 (what I will refer to as “IBE-P”). 
Although some progress has been made in recent years, our understanding of many of 
IBE-P’s fundamental traits remains underdeveloped.  
When instances of IBE-Ps appear in judge’s opinions, the argument takes 
                                                 
7 ibid 580 at [B]. 
8 ibid, 578-579. 
9 See, inter alia, David. A. Schum, ‘Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in Law’ 
(2001) 22 CardozoLawRev 1645; MS Pardo and RJ Allen ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’ 
(2008) 27 (3) LawPhilos 223; Amalia Amaya, The Tapestry of Reason (Hart Publishing 2015), 503ff. 
10 The literature on the IBE-P (or “legal abduction”) is sparse. Progress has been made by inter alia 
Amaya (n 9) 503-525; Scott Brewer, ‘Exemplary Reasoning: semantics, pragmatics, and the rational 
force of legal argument by analogy’ (1996) 109 HarvLRev 923 (who discussed legal abduction as an 
element of his account of legal analogy); Giovanni Tuzet, ‘L’abduzione dei Principi’ (2009) 33 Ragion 
Pratica 517. 
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enthymematic form, as it is common (and often appropriate) in legal argumentation: a 
legal argument does not normally wear its logical form on their sleeve. The same, of 
course, can be said about courts’ uses of deductive inference. But for someone trying 
to grasp the logical form of a loosely presented deductive legal argument, help is 
usually at hand: literature on the most common deductive forms, as well as on 
formally fallacious putative inferences, is well developed. Nothing similar is available 
when we analyse arguments that convey IBE-Ps. In what follows, I aim to provide 
some clarity about its structure and about the primary ways in which courts use it.  
In order to do so, I begin by introducing the basic features of the (not 
specifically legal) inference to the best explanation by contrasting it with other 
inferential forms. This section is primarily addressed to readers who are not familiar 
with the canonical inferential forms and, accordingly, readers who are familiar with 
them should feel free to skip it. In the second section, I start the main job of analysing 
the IBE-P and I do so by presenting an initial argument scheme. In the third section, I 
refine the scheme by discussing what kind (or kinds) of conclusion(s) such arguments 
try to establish. With that in place I move on to present, in the section, an account of 
“explanation”. In the fifth section, I discuss comparative criteria that can help 
adjudicate between rival explanations.  
 
1. Inference to the Best Explanation 101 
The Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)11 is one of the fundamental inferential 
forms, alongside deduction and, arguably, induction. 12 In all inferential forms the 
                                                 
11 CS Pierce was who first suggested that abduction would be an inferential form irreducible to either 
deduction or induction, although Pierce’s own account of it varied significantly over the decades (as 
shown by KT Fann, Pierce’s Theory of Abduction (Martinus Nijhoff 1970). 
12 Some contemporary accounts of induction suggest that it can be justified only if it is conceived as a 
subclass of IBE, thus reducing the basic inferential forms from three to two. See DM Armstrong, 
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truth of the premises offers support to the truth of the conclusion, but they vary 
widely on the kind of support they offer. While a deductive argument is truth-
preserving, in that the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion, the 
premises of neither inductive inferences nor IBEs offer that kind of support to their 
respective conclusions. In other words, in non-deductive inferences the truth of the 
premises is compatible with the conclusion being false. The matter of what precisely 
is the support (if any) given by premises on non-deductive inferences is contested. 
The conclusion is sometimes said to be probably true13 and sometimes it is said to be 
truthlike (i.e. closer to the truth)14. Also, in relation to IBE, there is the important 
question of whether the conclusion is likely and/or close to the truth in absolute terms 
or within a more limited set of comparators. 
Be that as it may, in IBE (as well as in induction) the truth of the premises is 
meant to give some support to the conclusion. The flip-side of IBE not being truth-
preserving is the fact that the inference is ampliative, that is to say, the conclusion 
contains more than what is contained in the premises15. When Lord Goff infers the 
existence of a general principle of change of position, his premise(s) pointed to the 
existence of two more particular kinds of cases in which (it could be argued that) the 
defence of change of position was admitted. The conclusion is ampler than the 
premises, in the sense that it adds to the knowledge conveyed in the premises: while 
the premises tell me of two classes of cases in which the defence should be admitted, 
                                                                                                                                           
‘What Makes Induction Rational?’ (1991) 30 Dialogue 503, and Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best 
Explanation (first edition 1991, second edition, Routledge 2004). 
13  Igor Douven, ‘Abduction’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer edn 2017), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/> section 2, accessed 15 July 2018. 
14 There are good reasons to believe that the idea of a “proximity to truth” is not analysable in terms of 
“probability”. The notion is interestingly discussed in Theo AF Kuipers, From Instrumentalism to 
Constructive Realism (Kluwer 2000). 
15 It is uncontroversial that IBEs possess this particular feature. See, for instance Douven (n 13) 1; in 
relation to legal IBE, Amalia (n 10) 505; Giovanni Tuzet, ‘Legal Abduction’ (2005) 6 Cognitio 265, 
274. 
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the conclusion widens the field of applicability of the defence. In addition, the 
existence of the general principle does not follow as a matter of logical necessity from 
the acceptance of a defence of change of position in those two particular classes of 
cases; but neither are the cases irrelevant for the conclusion Lord Goff reaches. The 
conclusion is meant to be supported, but not entailed, by the premises.  
Another crucial feature shared by IBE and inductive inferences is that they are 
non-monotonic. A good instance of an IBE might be rendered not as good (or indeed 
bad) by the addition of further premises. First order logical deductions, by contrast, 
are monotonic. If an argument is deductively valid (i.e. if from the truth of the 
premises the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily), the relation of logical 
entailment is not disturbed regardless of whether or not more premises are added to 
the original set of premises. If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, it necessarily 
follows that Socrates is mortal, regardless of whatever additional premise one adds to 
the set of premises. The same is not true in IBEs. A perfectly good explanation of a 
set of premises (say premises that describe empirical facts), might be rendered into a 
bad explanation if we add premises describing other facts that could not be accounted 
for in the original explanation. That is true of IBEs in general, not only ones about 
empirical facts. If you imagine a counter-factual situation in which another Law Lord 
would have raised, against Lord Goff’s argument, the (putatively) true claim that 
there are other cases (i) which would fall squarely within the scope of the suggested 
principle of change of position and (ii) in which previous courts have declined to 
apply such principle, it is easy to see that the strength of Lord Goff’s argument would 
have been negatively affected.  
  In sum: IBEs are non-truth-preserving, ampliative, and non-monotonic. 
To conclude this section, I would like to introduce an important distinction 
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that is sometimes overlooked by both general accounts of IBE and specific accounts 
of IBE-P. It is important to distinguish between the investigation of IBE as an 
inferential form and the investigation of IBE as a hypothesis-generating mechanism. 
It is common to claim that arguments that could be described as being “inferences to 
the best explanation” or “abductions” (expressions often used interchangeably) are 
hypothesis-generating.16 To claim that an item is hypothesis-generating is to place 
that item in the context of a given investigation. Presumably, an investigation that has 
a hypothesis-generating phase would also have a hypothesis-confirmation phase and, 
hence, would unfold in at least two phases. This is not the same as claiming that IBE 
is an inferential form, that is to say, a form of argument in which the premises give 
support to the claim that the conclusion is true (or probably true, or truthlike, either 
in absolute terms of relative to a set of rival explanatory theories).17  
Of course, there might be connections between IBE qua an aspect of an 
investigative process and IBE qua an inferential form. Qualifying IBE as hypothesis-
generating is not simply to say that a to-be-confirmed claim (a hypothesis) is 
generated, but it also says something about the quality of that hypothesis, namely, that 
it is a good enough candidate to trigger the second phase of the investigative 
procedure. Being good enough in that sense might plausibly turn on whether the 
hypothesis is more likely to be true than other rival candidates for a hypothesis about 
the relevant explananda, or perhaps on whether it is more truthlike than its rivals. So 
                                                 
16 A claim that has origins in Pierce’s work, but which found clear expression in NR Hanson, ‘Is There 
a Logic of Discovery?’ in H Feigl and G Maxwell (eds), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science 
(Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1961), 20-35. 
17 This is a claim famously spelled out by Gilbert Harman, ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ (1965) 
74 (1) PhilosRev 88, 89. The suggestion that there are two kinds of IBE, the weak (simply hypothesis 
generating) and the strong (which would include some sense of inferential support to one hypothesis 
over other(s)) relates to these two uses of the inference. See, inter alia, I Niiniluoto, ‘Defending 
Abduction’ (1999) 66 (supplement) PhilosSci S436. The vocabulary here can be confusing: sometimes 
the expression “Inference to the Best Explanation” is reserved to the inferential form, thus excluding 
the hypothesis-generating mechanism. At other times it appears to cover both, as in Amaya (n 10) 505-
8. As it will become clear in what follows, my interest here is on IBE as an inferential form.  
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that IBE is an inferential form might tell an important part of the story about why it is 
capable of generating good hypotheses, but whether or not it is a good inferential 
form does not turn on whether or not it is capable of being used in a particular way in 
a particular investigative method (paradigmatically, the scientific method).  
These considerations are not meant to suggest that IBE-P is a species of IBE, 
as there are very important features to IBE-P that do not fit easily with at least some 
accounts of IBE. They are just meant to highlight features that both IBE and IBE-P 
have in common and, thus, to clear the ground for an account of IBE-P’s more 
peculiar features. In the next section, we begin this explanation by providing an 
account of the inferential structure of IBE-P.  
 
2. An argument scheme for IBE-P 
At this stage it will be useful to provide a preliminary account of the argument’s basic 
structure and, in order to do so, I present, in this section, an argument scheme that 
aims at capturing IBE-P’s most salient properties.  
An argument scheme for IBE-P must fulfil a number of desiderata. At its most 
basic, an IBE departs from a certain set of items (the explanandum) and then asks 
what the best explanation (explanans) for the items is, inferring from (i) the truth of 
claims about the occurrence of the items and (ii) the explanatory relationship between 
them and the explanans, (iii) the truth of this explanation. Argument schemes that 
have been put forward in the literature for IBEs all attempt to capture these basic 
elements with different degrees of success. 
When trying to clarify the use of IBE-P by courts, however, such general 
argument schemes for IBEs should be approached with caution. Many such schemes 
bear the mark of the ways in which IBE is used in scientific research. Some build the 
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argument’s hypothesis-generating capacity into the conclusion and, as a result, the 
scheme’s conclusion is that a certain explanation “is a plausible hypothesis”18; others 
rely on concepts like ‘probability’ that seat uncomfortably with the categorical nature 
of judicial decision19; others still seem to imply that the explanatory relation refers to 
causal regularities20.  
The argument scheme for IBE-P should attempt to capture features (i), (ii), 
and (iii) in a way that does justice to the specificities of legal argumentation. The 
most obvious of such specificities is (iv) that the items that constitute both the 
explanandum and the explanans are normative sentences. In what follows, I will use 
the word “rule” to refer to each of the explananda and the word ‘principle’ to refer to 
the normative sentence that plays the role of the explanans in the argument21. I cannot 
emphasize enough that “rule” and “principle” are used here just to facilitate the 
identification of explananda and explanans: for my purposes here, there is no 
ontological difference between them. Another specificity, which will be discussed in 
detail in the next section, is that (v) courts often are creatively ambiguous about the 
type of conclusion they are arguing for and an argument scheme for IBE-P should be 
able to explain that ambiguity.  
                                                 
18 For instance, Walton’s well know scheme for abduction in D Walton, ‘Abductive, presumptive and 
plausible arguments’ (2014) 21 Informal Logic 141, 162: 
‘F is a finding or given set of facts. 
E is a satisfactory explanation of F. 
No alternative explanation E1 given so far is as satisfactory as E. 
Therefore, E is plausible, as a hypothesis.’ 
19 Like this proposal by Kreuzbauer in HM Kreuzbauer, ‘Inference to the Best Explanation in the Legal 
Universe: two challenges and one opportunity’ (2016) 47 Rechtstheorie 333, 336: ‘If a set F of [usually 
sufficiently explained ] facts F1…Fn, and a set E of potential explanations E1…En are given, the 
explanation Eb (for Eb ∈ E) explains the facts Fu…Fw (for {Fu…Fw} ⊆ F) best, the probability P that Eb 
corresponds with reality is higher than the probability, that any other explanation Ec (for Ec ∈ E\Eb) 
corresponds with reality’  
20 Lipton called this “The Causal Model” in chapter 3 of Lipton (n 12) 30ff.  
21 Jaap Hage has suggested at a discussion of this paper in Maastricht that retaining a conceptual 
difference between rules and principles within the scheme might boost its explanatory power, as the 
principles arrived at are norms that (i) remain one step further removed from the sources and (ii) that 
would explain them having different properties vis-à-vis the source rules. I find this suggestion 
intriguing but developing it would not be possible within the confines of this paper.  
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From items (i) through to (v) a picture of the desiderata for an argumentative 
scheme that captures the complex ways in which courts use IBEs emerges. One such 
scheme should account for how the argument takes a set of rules (the explanandum) 
to be best explained by a certain principle (the explanans), inferring from the 
existence of such rules and from that explanatory relationship between them and the 
relevant principle, something about that same principle. The following argument 
scheme spells out each of those elements: 
 
(1) Principle P1 explains R1, R2,…Rn. 
(2) No other principle explains each of R1, R2,…Rn better than P1. 
(3) If P1 explains R1, R2,…Rn,, and no other principle explains each of R1, 
R2,…Rn better than P1, then there is a reason to act according to P1.  
Therefore, from (1), (2), and (3), 
(4) There is a reason to act according to P1. 
 
This argument scheme requires further clarification. First, in relation to premise 
(3), it is not immediately clear how the explanatory relationship that features in the 
conditional’s antecedent could be a sufficient condition for the normative claim that 
features in its consequent. As it turns out, there are a number of different, and often 
concurrent, ways to make this relation plausible, although they each rely on 
presuppositions that are not free from controversy. The existence of concurrent, albeit 
controversial ways to make the conditional in (3) plausible is at the root of the 
apparent hesitation with which courts often lay out the conclusion(s) of the argument. 
In the next section I discuss different accounts of IBE-P’s conclusion and try to show 
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how each account of the conclusion can make the sufficiency relation expressed in (3) 
plausible (not without exacting an argumentative price).  
Second, some of the terminology used in the scheme is not self-evident, in 
particular the expressions “explains” (in the first two premises) and 
“explains…better” (in the second premise). As the support between premises and 
conclusion is predicated on the existence of an explanatory relationship between the 
rules contained in the explanandum (R1, R2,…Rn ) and the principle that explains 
them (P1), a complete account of IBE-P must elucidate what counts as an explanation 
(for the purposes of the inferential type). I address the question of what an explanation 
is for the purposes of IBE-P below, in section 4. 
Similarly, as the argument relies on a comparison between the explanatory 
quality of the explanation favoured (P1) and the explanatory quality of any other rival 
explanations, a complete account of IBE-P must shed light on the question of how one 
explanation (of the kind needed for IBE-Ps) might be better than another. This turns 
out to be a complex challenge, as there are different grounds for comparison: one 
explanation might compare positively to another on grounds of coverage of the 
explanandum (when P1 explains more explananda than P2); alternatively, even if both 
P1 and P2 fully explain partially coincident sets of rules, only the rules belonging to 
the set explained by P1 might truly belong together, the set explained by P2 not being 
explanatorily homogeneous (ie, the set is either over-inclusive or under-inclusive); or 
perhaps it is one of the principle’s intrinsic properties that makes it superior qua 
explanation (eg principle P1 might have more moral or legal credence than  principle 
P2). A complete account of the comparative criteria cannot be given within the 
confines of this article, but I will shed some light on this comparative aspect of IBE-
P’s in this article’s fifth section. 
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3. IBE-P’s Conclusion and some ways to make Premise (3) Plausible 
Recall that the question Lord Goff is addressing in the relevant section of his opinion 
in Lipkin Gorman is whether or not the principle of change of position ‘is, or should 
be, recognised as a defence to claims in restitution’.22 As we saw above, he reports 
that the majority scholarly opinion is that ‘such a defence should be recognised in 
English law’, and he agrees.23 He also states that ‘the time for its recognition in this 
country is […] long overdue’. 24  Lord Goff here seems to hesitate between two 
versions of the conclusion his argument is driving at. Either his conclusion describes 
an existing principle within the English legal system or else his conclusion is that one 
such principle should be part of the English legal system. The ambivalence is 
compounded by many factors that can be found in the speech: the use of the verb “to 
recognise” (which might offer some support to the descriptive nature of the 
conclusion), as well as the fact that Lord Goff offers, in addition to the IBE, other 
grounds to the conclusion (in particular comparative law and policy considerations) 
which cannot easily be interpreted as militating in favour of a conclusion that simply 
describes an aspect of existing law.  
This sort of hesitation between a conclusion which merely unveils a hitherto 
opaque aspect of established law and a conclusion in favour of introducing a measure 
of change in the legal system is far from unusual in contexts in which judges argue 
from a collection of cases to a general principle25. As we will see below, this feature 
                                                 
22 Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale ltd, n.1, 578 at [F]. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid, 580. 
25 To mention but one other famous example, Lord Denning, in his obiter in Lloyds Bank v Bundy, 
claims that ‘[t]here are cases in our books in which the courts will set aside a contract (…) when the 
parties have not met on equal terms (...). Hitherto those exceptional cases have been treated each as a 
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of judicial decisions is not itself rhetorically inert; there are good reasons for judges to 
be ambiguous about the nature of the conclusion they are trying to justify when they 
deploy IBE-Ps.  
It has been suggested in the academic literature that IBE-Ps militate in favour 
of a claim that a certain “unexpressed”26 or “implicit”27 legal norm exists (call it C1). 
Commenting on Donoghue v Stevenson, for example, Neil MacCormick wrote that, in 
his speech, Lord Atkin saw ‘the negligence cases as grounded in a principle that was 
more implicit in them than as yet fully explicated’28. Judicial opinions give some 
extra credence to such claims, as when Lord Goff talks about “recognising” a legal 
principle or when Lord Atkin writes that ‘in English law there must be, and is, some 
general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular 
cases found in the books are but instances.’29.  
An advantage of conceiving courts’ use of IBE-P as support for a conclusion 
about the existence of an implicit legal principle is that it makes it easier to see why 
courts might be allowed (perhaps even required) to apply to the case at hand a 
principle that has been mined from a plurality of cases. Courts are primarily law-
applying political institutions and there is nothing remarkable about them applying the 
legal norms they can identify in legal sources to the cases put to them.  
So, one way in which the conditional in premise (3) can be made plausible is 
to take the explanatory relation as evidencing the existence of an implicit legal 
                                                                                                                                           
separate category in itself. But I think the time has come when we should seek to find a principle to 
unite them.’ (Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 A11 ER 757, 763). 
26 See inter alia Neil MacCormick, ‘Donoghue v. Stevenson and Legal Reasoning’ in PT Burns and SJ 
Lyons (eds), Donoghue v. Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence Proceeding of the Paisleu 
Conference on the Law of Negligence  (University of British Columbia 1991) 191; Scott Brewer’s 
‘Analogy Warranting  Rule’ (n 10) 570;  R. Guastini L’interpretazione dei documenti normative (Dott. 
A. Giuffre Editore 2004) 209; G. Tuzet gives a helpful overview of the Italian literature at (n 10) 
above, 525-532. 
27 MacCormick (n 26) 201. 
28 ibid, 202. 
29 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 582 (italics added). 
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principle which, if combined with a plausible claim about courts having a reason to 
decide according to the law, would yield a conclusion about courts having a reason to 
apply P1 to the instant case. 
But the claim that courts can infer implicit legal principles from collections of 
cases has been resisted. There is a worry that the inference simply would not run if its 
conclusion were an unexpressed, but nevertheless authoritative, ‘legal principle’.  
Alexander and Sherwin, for instance, claim that whatever principle might be 
generated by legal abduction (i.e. IBE-P) ‘should not be treated as authoritative’ and 
(presumably) legal. 30 According to the objection, a crucial aspect of what makes 
something a legal norm is its authority, and as the explanatory relationship between 
rules and principle is unable to convey authority from the former to the latter, it 
follows that whatever principle might explain the relevant rules cannot be considered 
authoritative and, by implication, legal.  
We must be careful here not to wade unnecessarily into the murky waters of 
legal ontology and thus fall into the temptation of settling the vexed question of what 
conditions must be met by a normative standard in order for it to qualify as “legal” as 
a preamble to providing an account of the IBE-P in law. In fact, there are clear senses 
in which the inferred principle in an IBE-P is legal regardless of the answer one might 
give to the ontological question.  In the first place, the principle is put forward as an 
explanation for a series of legal materials (not of moral intuitions, physical facts, a 
canonical religious text, or a musical score). Secondly, courts deploy such arguments 
when they try to work out how do decide cases put to them in a way that takes into 
account the law and, in fact, some instances of IBE-P are regarded as particularly 
                                                 
30 L Alexander and E Sherwin, ‘Judges as Rule-Makers’, in DE Edlin (ed), Common Law Theory 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 27, 48. 
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inspired instances of legal argumentation. So, in order to avoid the ontological 
problem, one might try and come up with alternatives to conceiving the conclusion of 
IBE-Ps as a claim about the pertinence of a particular normative principle, not 
explicitly formulated in the legal sources, to a particular legal system (i.e. a claim 
about what the law is).  
One such alternative is to conceive the conclusion of an IBE-P as a claim that 
courts have a (pro tanto) moral reason to act in accordance with a certain principle, 
regardless of whether or not it belongs to the legal system (call it C2). This 
conclusion matches directly the conclusion in the scheme put forward in the previous 
section. One could also say that, perhaps in addition to the latter claim, courts use 
IBE-P in order to ground claims that there is a (pro tanto) reason to act in such way as 
to introduce a certain principle in the legal system, a reason that might be further 
specified (in legal systems that accept a version of stare decisis), into a reason for the 
court to generate precedents that affirm such principle (call it C3). Both C2 and C3 
are normative claims, the former regarding how the court should decide a certain class 
of cases (those which follow under P1), the latter regarding whether (and how) there is 
reason to change the legal system so as to introduce P1. If the conclusion of a court’s 
IBE-P were indeed a normative claim, one would have to rely on some sort of 
normative justification for premise (3), that is to say, for the sufficiency relationship 
between the antecedent (the claim that P1 is an explanation and that it is better than 
any other explanation) and the consequent (there being a reason to act in a particular 
way). There are a number of substantive claims that might be able to support such 
connection, the best known being the conception of public morality that defends the 
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value of coherence in judicial reasoning31. In fact, coherence has often also been 
offered as a justification for the existence of implicit legal principles32. However, 
regardless of its usefulness to settle the metaphysical question about what kinds of 
normative standards are properly called “legal”, coherence could still be able to 
justify the existence of a reason for the court to decide in a particular way. A defence 
of (3) could run along the following lines: if acting coherently is valuable and if the 
existence of a unifying principle that connects the rules explanatorily is a reason to 
believe that the actions required by such rules are coherent, then there is a reason to 
act as required by the unifying principle. Coherence is, of course, not the only 
possible normative justification for (3). Other substantive justifications such as the 
value of predictability might also be able to offer a grounding to (3), at least under 
certain circumstances. Be that as it may, the normative conclusions C2 and C3 rely on 
the existence of a normative underpinning for premise (3) in our scheme. That is not 
an insignificant price to be paid for the plausibility of premise (3), as the ongoing 
disagreement about the value of coherence demonstrates.  
So whether IBE-P’s normative conclusion is best conceived as being mediated 
by a descriptive claim about the existence of a legal principle (like C1) or not (like in 
C2 and C3) the argument’s soundness would be predicated on demanding and 
controversial background assumptions, respectively on legal metaphysics and on 
normative ethics. Here lies the rhetorical value of a court’s apparent hesitation 
between making descriptive claims like C1 and making normative claims like C2 and 
                                                 
31  The literature on the value of coherence in legal reasoning is vast and no footnote would do justice 
to its breath and depth, it ranges from legal theory classics (e.g. Ronald Dworkin’s  Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth 1977) 31-35 and Neil MacCormick’s Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP 
1978) 39, 106-108) to contemporary comprehensive defenses of coherence in legal theory (in particular 
Amaya (n 9) above). There are well known objections to the claim that coherence has value in legal 
decision-making, as those leveled by Joseph Raz in J Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ in Joseph 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Paperbacks 1994) 277-325. 
32 Neil MacCormick, for instance, relates coherence with implicit legal principles in his discussion of 
Donoghue v Stevenson in MacCormick (n 26) 17. 
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C3. By not foreclosing one route to the conclusion, they widen the scope of 
acceptability of their IBE-Ps, which would be seen as sound both by those who 
believe in the legality of (implicit) legal principles that explain a given set of legal 
norms and by those who subscribe to a determined set of substantive normative 
positions. So, in using IBE-Ps courts might be offering different arguments, each of 
which might lead to a justification for deciding the instant case on the basis of the 
principle inferred. There is no reason relating to its inferential form why an IBE-P 
would not be able to support each of those routes towards the conclusion, given 
different sets of assumptions. 
It is worth noticing that those different routes are closely related. Thus, as we 
have seen, adding to C1 the very plausible claim that courts have a reason to apply the 
law, C2 obtains. Similarly, as we saw above, if one adds to a reason to introduce a 
certain principle in the legal system (C3) the claim that the court can introduce 
principles by deciding according to them (as it might happen in systems that accept a 
version of stare decisis), C2 would also follow. In other words, when courts display 
hesitation between reaching normative or descriptive conclusions in their deployment 
of IBE-Ps, they can be understood as arguing in the alternative for C2. That is one of 
the reasons why C2 features as the conclusion of the argument scheme presented in 
the previous section. It is also worth noticing that the strength of the reason that 
features in the argument’s conclusion is sensitive both to the strength of the 
explanatory relationship in premise (1) and the strength of the comparison in premise 
(2)33.  
Having considered the nature of the conclusion of an IBE-P, it is now 
necessary to turn my attention to the premises that purport to justify such conclusion. 
                                                 
33 I am grateful to the OJLS reviewer who brought this point to my attention.  
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In the next section I address the questions about the explanatory relationship, raised 
by the first premise featured in the argument scheme, while in the fifth section I 
consider the comparison between explanations which features in premise (2). 
 
4. Explanation in IBE-P 
In the literature on IBE the explananda are often referred to as “facts”. Thus in crime 
novels, the inference that explains whodunit runs from a number of fictional facts 
sprinkled along the text. Similarly, in scientific research the explananda are often 
presented as observed facts. Not surprisingly, in some of the literature about legal 
uses of IBE, there is talk about the inference running from premises about facts34. 
Although this is perfectly acceptable in a general account of IBE, the category of 
“facts” might well prove to be over-inclusive when one focuses on more specific uses 
of IBE. Specific features of a subcategory of “facts” might have an impact on what 
counts as an explanation of those facts (ie accounts of “explanation” are sensitive to 
the particular class of facts that are being explained).  
As we have seen above, the particular facts that constitute the explananda in 
IBE-Ps are legal rules or fragments of legal rules. In Lipkin Gorman, Lord Goff 
identifies two specific legal rules which he believes can be explained by the principle 
of change of position, namely, (1) that an agent can defeat a claim to restitution on the 
ground that, before learning of the plaintiff's claim, he has paid the money over to his 
principal or otherwise altered his position in relation to his principal on the faith of the 
payment (the Good Faith Agent rule); and (2) that if money is paid under forged bills 
of exchange, in addition to other conditions (not fully specified by Lord Goff), then 
                                                 
34 eg HM Kreuzbauer (n 19) 336-337.  
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the money is irrecoverable (the Forged Bills of Exchange rule). 35 In spite of the 
relatively convoluted formulations, each of those legal rules describes a situation 
under which money cannot be recovered on grounds of restitution. 
If we accept that the explananda in an IBE-P are legal rules, the question 
invites itself as to which kinds of explanation can be given of legal norms. A few 
candidates immediately spring to mind. In the first place, legal norms can be 
explained genealogically. We might be able to trace the social and/or legal historical 
facts that causally contributed for the particular legal norm to be considered by courts 
as part of the particular legal system. Among the many causes that contributed to the 
acceptance by courts of the “Forged Bills of Exchange” rule is the perceived division 
of labour and responsibilities in banking practice between bankers and clients in the 
late 1700’s in England (when Price v. Neil36, the most remote site of recognition of 
the norm in English case law, was decided). However, this sort of causal explanation 
is not promising as it makes premise (3) in our scheme at least prima facie 
implausible. In the first place, causes are not principles and it is not clear how one 
could have a reason to act “according to” the facts that caused a legal rule into 
existence. Secondly, and more importantly, knowledge of how a certain legal rule was 
caused into being does not, in itself, provide a reason for action. So this is not the 
sense of explanation we need to make sense of an IBE-P (although a qualified sense 
of the genealogical explanation might be able to do it, as we will see towards the end 
of this section). 
Another, more promising, way of explaining a legal rule is to specify what 
makes it a norm belonging to the relevant legal system. In relation to the Forged Bills 
                                                 
35 See (n 5). 
36 Price v Neil [1762] 97 E.R. 871. 
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of Exchange rule, one might point to an authoritative case whose ratio decidendi is 
the rule being explained (say, Price v. Neil) and, in a legal system that embraces the 
doctrine of state decisis, that would be a sufficient explanation of what makes the rule 
in question legal. This kind of explanation might be useful in many contexts and, 
indeed, appeal to legal sources in order to ground claims that certain norms belonging 
to the legal system is the bread and butter of legal argumentation. Nevertheless, this is 
also not the kind of explanation that we need in order to provide an account of IBE-P. 
This sort of explanation points to the authoritative source that makes the rule legal, 
but does not specify a principle that would make premise (3) plausible.  
The explanation that might make premise (3) plausible is part of the answer to the 
question: “what reason, other than the source rules’ legality, might one have for acting 
as required by them?”  The answer to this question is a justification for acting in the 
way required by the source rules and, hence, the principle that features in IBE-P’s 
conclusion is part of that justification. Accordingly, an account of IBE-P should shed 
light on that justificatory relationship between what the source rules require and the 
explanatory principle. That relationship is one in which the principle provides a 
reason to act as required by the source rule. In other words, the principle would be a 
sufficient reason for there being a reason to act as required by the rule, something that 
can be expressed in conditional form as:  
If P1, then there is a reason to act as required by R1, R2,…Rn. 
 
As the conditional form makes manifest, the relevant justificatory relation 
presupposes neither that the explanatory principle is true nor that the principle is a 
necessary condition for there being a reason to act as required by the source rules. In 
that sense, the justification required by IBE-P is merely conjectural: the argument 
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would run regardless of whether either the antecedent or the consequent of the 
conditional is true. In fact, the argument would run even if both antecedent and 
consequent were false.  
In addition, the justificatory relationship required by IBE-P is weak, in the 
sense that all that is required is that P1 provides a pro tanto reason for acting 
according to the source rules. It might turn out that there are other reasons that would 
successfully countervail the reason grounded on P1 and it might even be that such 
countervailing reasons necessarily obtain. Furthermore, affirming the justificatory 
relationship does not commit one to accept that the source rules should be part of the 
legal system. 
Notice that this catholic conception of explanation allows for multiple rival 
explanations. That is to be expected in an account of the inference to the best 
explanation. In the next section of the paper we address the comparative challenge of 
how to compare the quality of rival explanations.  
This account of the explanatory relationship allows us to refine our initial 
scheme for the IBE-P. 
(1) If there were a principle P1, then there would be a reason to act as 
required by R1, R2,…Rn. 
(2) No other principle is better than P1 at providing a reason to act as 
required by each R1, R2,…Rn. 
(3) If (if there were a principle P1, then there would be a reason to act as 
required by R1, R2,…Rn), and no other principle is better than P1 at 
providing a reason to act as required by each R1, R2,…Rn, then there is a 
reason to act according to P1.  
Therefore, from (1), (2), and (3), 
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(4) There is a reason to act according to P1. 
  
But this is all too abstract. It might help to go back to Lipkin Gorman. As we saw 
above, Lord Goff identifies two rules at the outset of his argument, the Good Faith 
Agent rule and the Forged Bills of Exchange rule. The explanation that his argument 
relies on is an answer to the question: why would one have a reason to deny recovery 
of money had and received when, respectively, (i) an agent has paid the money over 
to his principal on the faith of the payment and (ii) when money is paid under forged 
bills of exchange presented by the defendant in good faith. In addition, the answer 
sought must comply with the proviso that the legal rules should not feature in the 
explanatory justification. The question of whether those are good rules to have in the 
legal system in the first place is bracketed out.  
The answer Lord Goff gives is the principle of Change of Position, which 
roughly states that it is inequitable for the plaintiff to require restitution if said 
restitution would ‘leave the defendant in a worse position than the position he would 
have occupied if he had never received the enrichment’ provided the defendant acts in 
good faith.37 If this principle is true, there would be a reason to comply with both the 
Good Faith Agent rule and the Forged Bills of Exchange rule and this is how the 
principle of Change of Position can be said to explain the source rules. The principle 
explains why each of the two sets of facts picked up by each rule would be a reason to 
deny restitution. We can present this argument in the shape of our revised 
argumentative scheme: 
                                                 
37 In Paul Key’s formulation, at Paul Key, ‘Change of Position’ (2011) 58 (4) MLR 505, 506-507. 
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(1) If there were a Principle of Change of Position, then there would be a 
reason to act as required by the Good Faith Agent rule and by the 
Forged Bills of Exchange rule. 
(2) No principle other than the principle of Change of Position is better at 
providing a reason to act as required by each the Good Faith Agent rule 
and by the Forged Bills of Exchange rule 
(3) If (If there were a Principle of Change of Position, then there would be 
a reason to act as required by the Good Faith Agent rule and by the 
Forged Bills of Exchange rule) and (No principle other than the principle 
of Change of Position is better at providing a reason to act as required 
by each the Good Faith Agent rule and by the Forged Bills of Exchange 
rule), then there is a reason to act according to the principle of Change of 
Position.  
Therefore, from (1), (2), and (3), 
(4) There is a reason to act according to the principle of Change of Position. 
 
Before we leave this topic, two further points about of the justificatory relation in 
IBE-P deserve mention. First, it is possible to give a genealogical reading to that 
relation, as a way to track the normative considerations that the actual norm producers 
had in mind, in one way or another, while positing the particular legal authority (eg 
the normative considerations that influenced the judges who decided Price v Neil to 
introduce the Forged Bills of Exchange rule)38.  It is not clear whether one such 
reading would be sufficient to render premise (3) plausible, but the idea should not be 
dismissed out of hand. A sufficiently complex conception of how the mind works, 
                                                 
38 I am thankful to one of OJLS’s anonymous reviewers for bringing this point to my attention.  
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combined with the value of being faithful to the intention of lawmakers might just do 
the trick. But this genealogical reading is far from he only possible way in which the 
justificatory relationship might have reason-generating potential. The justificatory 
relation explains how the decision the argument is driving at is coherent with 
previously settled legal rules and that, arguably, is a reason to act that is partially 
insulated from the justificatory capacity of P1. Regrettably, a full analysis of how the 
justificatory relation might make premise (3) plausible goes well beyond the scope of 
what can be accomplished in this article. Such analysis would be crucial for a 
complete account of the value of IBE-Ps, but my main concern here is not to provide 
one such account.  
Second, the justificatory relation in IBE-Ps, as mentioned above, is often 
programmatic. The credence of a specific principle from which springs the reason to 
act according to what is required by the source rule might be either predicated on, or 
enhanced by, embedding the principle into a normative programme which includes 
other norms and/or factual assumptions. In simpler cases, the principle itself might 
have sufficient credence to work as a justification and embedding it into a normative 
programme would not add much to it. In a hypothetical case in which the source rules 
are “thou shall not kill men” and that “thou shall not kill women”, the principle that 
“thou shall not kill humans” cannot be deductively derived from it (as there are 
instances of humans who are neither men nor women), but such principle is a 
sufficient justification of our hypothetical source rules. That will not always be the 
case, though.  
The programmatic aspect of IBE-P justifications is apparent in Lipkin 
Gorman, as the principle of Change of Position’s justificatory potential is predicated 
on the existence of other rules in the legal system, in particular the rules about the 
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restitution of unjustified enrichment. After all, Change of Position is a defence in a 
lawsuit grounded on the principle that one has to pay back what was unjustly received 
and, as such, it is a part of a wider normative programme that also contains other rules 
(and perhaps also factual assumptions) that provide the background against which the 
defence is meaningful. Change of Position’s credence is predicated on this normative 
programme. As we saw above, this plausibility does not imply accepting this 
normative programme as ultimately warranted. One might accept the justificatory 
plausibility of the programme, while still believing the law of unjustified enrichment 
to be a mistake and that legal systems should be reorganized in such way that, say, 
title was only bestowed upon someone in the situations which would not give margin 
to unjustified enrichment (thus making the whole edifice of unjustified enrichment 
redundant, at great cost to bona fide third parties who trusted the appearance of title). 
With this justificatory account of the explanation in place, and given that, as we saw 
above, it allows for multiple rival explanations, we should now consider the question 
of what makes one explanation better than another.  
 
5. The Best Explanation 
We saw in the previous section a second way in which IBE-P might fail: the putative 
explanatory principle might turn out not to be a good explanation of the source norms 
and, consequently, premise (1) in the argumentative scheme would be false. In the 
present section I want to consider another way in which the argument might fail. 
Premise (2) or our revised scheme makes it part of the inference that “No other 
principle is better than P1 at providing a reason to act as required by each R1, 
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R2,…Rn.” This premise captures the comparative character of IBE-P39. After all, the 
inference does not rely simply on the existence of an explanation, which are legion, 
but on the best explanation, which is only one. Of course, premise (2) does not need 
to be proven by further argument every time IBE-P is deployed, but whoever uses this 
inferential form is committed to P1 being the best explanation to each of the 
explananda.  
What precisely makes an explanation better than another is, however, not a 
simple question.40 In particular, it is not clear what criteria for best explanation would 
be useful in the context of IBE-P. As we saw above, IBE-P is predicated on the 
conditional premise (3), which connects the existence of a best explanation in the 
antecedent, with a normative consequent to the effect that there is a reason to act 
according to the principle that best explains the source rules. That means that the 
reasons that make an explanation comparatively better must be part of a story about 
the plausibility of (3). This requirement should be kept in mind when considering the 
suitability for an account of IBE-P of properties identified in the literature about IBE 
as promising grounds for explanatory comparison.   
Take the three properties that have generated most discussion in the general 
literature on IBE: simplicity, ‘analogy’ (as defined by Thagard41), and consilience.42 
                                                 
39 The comparative element is so relevant that some accounts of IBE suggest that the inference should 
be analysed into two stages, an explanation-generating stage and an explanation-selection stage. See P. 
Lipton (n 12) 148-151; in legal reasoning the point is made by Amalia Amaya at Amaya (n 9) 504-506. 
40 In the literature that discusses scientific uses of IBE comparison might be made in relation to how 
much the available evidence supports the explanation (the explanation’s ‘likeliness’), how much 
insight it brings (its ‘loveliness’), or sometimes a combination of both. See Lipton (n 12) 59-62.  
41 P Thagard, ‘The best explanation: criteria for theory choice’ (1978) 75 (2) JPhilos 76, 91. Thagard is 
not entirely clear in relation to what he means by analogy, starting from a more traditional conception 
of analogy as a form of property transfer between the analogues but quickly moving to an epistemic 
account of analogy in which its main gain is that it facilitates understanding. As he put it, “other things 
being equal the explanations afforded by a theory are better explanations if the theory is familiar, that 
is, introduces mechanisms, entities, or concepts that are used in established explanations” (ibid, 91). 
For him, analogy makes an explanation better because it makes the explanation familiar and, as a 
result, more easily graspable. 
42 For a discussion of all three see ibid, passim. 
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In relation to the first two, the fact that an explanatory principle is simpler or more 
analogous might add to the heuristic value of the explanation but, in themselves, they 
would offer no reason to think that explanatory principle superior to others. For those 
properties to become relevant in relation to (3)’s plausibility more is needed. One way 
to see that relevance is to postulate that predictability is a sufficient ground for (3) and 
that either simplicity and/or analogy would help enhance predictability in certain 
factual scenarios. 
Consilience, by contrast, is a property of normative explanations that, used as 
a ground for comparison between explanatory principles, would more directly affect 
the plausibility of the conditional in (3) if we accept the value of acting coherently43. 
Consilience relates to the greater of lesser explanatory coverage that an explanation 
might have in relation to a given explanandum. In what follows, I shall try to motivate 
the claim above by providing an account of normative consilience and of the 
preliminary problem of what makes a given rule a part of an explanandum. As I will 
try to demonstrate, consilience is a property that the best explanation necessarily has 
and, as such, helps to rule out other explanations. Consilience, however, is not 
sufficient. Other grounds for comparison between explanations might have to (and 
often are) relied upon, in particular the comparative quality of the candidate 
normative explanations in relation to external benchmarks (such as an assessment of 
their relative moral merit or demerit in each of them), for better or worse. But before 
getting to that point, the candidate explanations’ consilience must be settled and in 
                                                 
43  Amalia Amaya suggests that coherence as the master criterion for adjudicating between legal 
explanations at Amaya (n 9) 511. The claim that coherence makes for a better explanation has been 
made outwith the legal context by G Harman, ‘Reasoning and Explanatory Coherence’ (1980) 17/2 
AmPhilosQ 151, and others. In fact, the three specific criteria mentioned by Thagard (n 39) above, 
might be seen as an attempt to unpack the idea of explanatory coherence put forward (vaguely) by 
Gilbert Harman in his Thought (Princeton University Press 1973) 159. 
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order to understand that, as mentioned above, one has to investigate how the 
explanatory principle can be said to cover the explanandum. 
In order to understand the different ways in which an explanatory principle 
can relate to an explanandum it is necessary to have clarity about what makes a 
particular rule a member of an explanandum (for the purposes of an IBE-P). A set of 
legal rules does not necessarily constitute an explanandum. The inference is 
predicated on the fact that the relevant rules ‘belong together’, that they invite a 
common explanation. Things are made complicated by the fact that it is not sufficient 
for a group of rules to “belong together” that each item shares the property of 
“belonging to the legal system”. Arguably, pertinence to a given legal system is not 
even a necessary condition for a rule to feature in the explanandum, as the growing 
use of comparative material by courts and lawyers seems to demonstrate. 
In practice, IBE-Ps often proceed on the basis of an acceptance by the relevant 
argumentative players that the rules requiring common explanation do indeed belong 
together and such agreements are reached by reference to shared properties such as 
“being located in the same section of a legislative document” (say a Civil Code), or 
“being a part of the same common law doctrine”, or “belonging to the same sub-area 
of law”. Those properties (and others similar in flavour) are often sufficient for 
lawyers to agree that certain norms should be included in the explanandum, but that 
hardly settles the question. For explanatory homogeneity is not equivalent to being 
topologically close in legislation, or belonging to the same common law doctrine, or 
being traditionally placed within the same sub-area of law. Each such properties 
works well as a practical roadmap for the identification of explananda because they 
relate somewhat reliably (albeit contingently) to another shared property, one that is 
necessary in order for an IBE-P to run.  
 29 
We must here proceed with caution. One candidate for a shared property is 
something along the lines of “being explained by principle Px”. This property would 
obviously make “belonging together” explanatorily relevant for the purposes of an 
IBE-P, but it overshoots the target. The problem here is that being explained by a 
certain principle is not a sufficient condition for explanatory homogeneity. It is 
perfectly possible that two legal rules be explainable by a given principle and yet that 
they are not explanatorily homogeneous in the sense that an IBE-P requires.  
In order to explain the relation between rules that is necessary for an IBE-P, 
allow me to return to Lipkin Gorman briefly. Recall that the two source rules used by 
Lord Goff were the “Good Faith Agent” rule and the “Forged Bills of Exchange” rule. 
Each of these rules offers an answer to a different normative question. The Good 
Faith Agent rule offers an answer to the following question: 
(Q1): Is a defence against a claim grounded on restitution available to an agent 
who, in good faith, received a mistaken payment made by a third party and 
passed it on to his principal? 
Similarly, the Forged Bills of Exchange rule offers an answer to the question: 
(Q2): Is a defence against a claim grounded on restitution available to someone 
who, in good faith, received money from the putative issuer of a forged bill of 
exchange (upon presentation of said bill of exchange) if the defendant had 
previously (and also in good faith), paid money to a third party for said bill of 
exchange? 
 
Each rule offers an answer to a different normative question. But the difference 
should not be overstated. There is a sense in which the two questions should be 
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considered to be the same44. That would happen if (Q1) and (Q2) are sub-questions of 
a more general question, whose answer implies a uniform answer to both (Q1) and 
(Q2). One reasonable candidate to a more general question could be: 
(Q3) Is a defence against a claim grounded on restitution available to a 
businessperson whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable in 
all the circumstances to require him to make restitution? 
The reason why (Q3) is a more general question with regard to (Q1) and (Q2) is that an 
answer to (Q3) would imply (in Lord Goff’s opinion) a uniform answer to (Q1) and 
(Q2). The answer to (Q3) would be a norm that entails both the Good Faith Agent rule 
and the Forged Bills of Exchange rule. This is the sense in which the two source rules 
picked out by Lord Goff could be considered the same: the general normative 
questions that they answer are sub-questions of a more general normative question, 
whose answer implies a uniform answer to the questions corresponding to the source 
rules. Affirming that two rules are explanatorily homogeneous is to affirm that they 
are the same in this particular respect.  
Notice that one might sensibly hold a belief that there is a more general 
normative question of which source questions are sub-questions even in the absence 
of a formulation of such comprehensive question. In fact, when presented with a 
conclusive objection to a certain formulation of the comprehensive question, one 
might be inclined to give up on a formulation while still holding on to the claim that 
there is one such comprehensive question. Consider the following objection to (Q3): 
the formulation is underinclusive as it unduly restricts the normative rationale of (Q1) 
and (Q2) to businesspeople. It is true that in the particular cases that prompted the 
                                                 
44 Luis Duarte d’Almeida and I have explained this idea in more detail in L Duarte d’Almeida and C 
Michelon, ‘The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law’ (2017) 31 (2) Argumentation 377. 
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formulation of the Good Faith Agent rule and the Forged Bills of Exchange rule the 
defendants were indeed businesspeople but whatever answer is to be given to (Q1) and 
(Q2), one might think, should also apply to private individuals who do not fall under 
the category of businesspeople. Faced with such objection, it would not be unnatural 
to retain the sense that there is a similarity between (Q1) and (Q2), and try to provide a 
better formulation of the comprehensive question, perhaps along the lines of: 
(Q4) Is a defence against a claim grounded on restitution available to someone 
whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the 
circumstances to require him to make restitution? 
The principle of Change of Position, as formulated by Lord Goff, offers an answer to 
question (Q4).45 But it is important to notice that Lord Goff does not seem to be 
particularly confident of his own formulation. As it often happens in judicial decisions 
that infer principles, Lord Goff believes that his formulation of the principle leaves 
room for further refining by future courts. He states that ‘[i]t is not however 
appropriate in the present case to attempt to identify all those actions in restitution to 
which change of position may be a defence’46 and that   
[a]t present I do not wish to state the principle any less broadly than 
this: that the defence is available to a person whose position has so 
changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require 
him to make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full.47 
 
Lord Goff’s opinion of his own formulation exemplifies a situation in which one 
might be more confident that the source questions should receive a uniform answer 
                                                 
45 [1991] 2 AC 548, 586 at [E]. 
46 ibid, 586 at [D]. 
47 ibid, 586 at [E]. 
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(i.e. that they raise the same normative issues) than one is about the normative issue 
that has been singled out. 
Thus an explanandum comprises source rules whose corresponding general 
normative questions are sub-questions of a more general comprehensive question. 
This way of understanding the explanandum helps comprehend why a principle can 
only count as a candidate for the best explanation of a set of rules if it is the best 
explanation of each of the rules contained in the explanandum. This requirement rules 
out as best explanations all principles that could explain each of the source rules, but 
which would not be the best explanation of at least one of them. So it is not enough 
for the inference to run that the explanatory principle is the best common explanation 
to the source rules. For the inference to run, it must be the case that the relevant 
normative point each of the source rules is trying to resolve is, in the sense explained 
above, the same. In the argument scheme (and in the revised argument scheme) this 
requirement is conveyed in premise (2). 
With that in place, we can now return to the comparative criteria. In a complex 
explanandum, constituted by many source rules, different rule subsets might be 
explained by rival principles. In the simplest case of rival explanatory principles, 
where a principle P1 provides an explanation for all the explananda accounted for by 
another principle P2 while, in addition, also providing an explanation for parts of the 
explanandum that are not explained by P2, P1 would clearly provide a better coverage 
of the explanandum than P2. If we accept that one valuable feature of an explanation 
is ‘how much a theory explains’48 (ie its consilience) and that “one theory is more 
                                                 
48 Thagard (n 39) 79. 
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consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts than the other does”49 it is 
easy to conclude that P1 will be a better explanatory principle than P2. 
Things are more complicated when two or more principles are plausible 
candidates for being the best explanation of all the source rules. Dialectically, a 
typical way to attack the credence of one putative explanatory principle vis-à-vis a 
rival candidate explanatory principle is to argue that there are other legal rules, not 
considered hitherto, that belong together with the source rules, thus expanding the 
explanandum. This relates to IBE’s non-monotonicity: an IBE-P might be vulnerable 
to the addition of a new premise either to the effect that the putative principle is not 
explanatory in relation to a rule (Rx) not included in original inference argument, or to 
the effect that a principle different from P1 is better at providing a reason for Rx. If the 
new rule “belongs together” with the source rules of the original inference, the 
inference would not run. It is interesting to notice, however, that it is not uncommon 
that conflicting rules (and sometimes the corresponding cases) are brushed aside by 
the courts. Lord Goff, for instance, recognizes, in passing that there are cases which 
are inconsistent with the existence of a general defence of Change of Position in 
English law.50  
There is more than one way in which normative consilience might be relevant 
in relation to the plausibility of the conditional in (3). First, and more obviously, 
normative consilience confirms the existence of coherence between the source legal 
rules: they are all justifiable by the principle, which answers their common normative 
question. If courts were to act according to the principle in the future, their actions 
                                                 
49 ibid, 91. 
50 See (n 1) 579, where he affirms that: ‘There has however been no general recognition of any defence 
of change of position as such; indeed any such defence is inconsistent with the decisions of the 
Exchequer Division in Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England and Wales (1880) B 6 
Q.B.D. 234, and of the Court of Appeal in Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127.’ 
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would also cohere with the explanandum. As a result, all that is needed to make (3) 
plausible is to accept that courts have a reason to act coherently with past court 
decisions. The more consilient an explanatory principle is, the stronger would the 
coherence be between the future decision and the actions that are required by the rules 
contained in the explanandum. 
But coherence is only one of the ways in which consilience might make (3) 
plausible. If one supposes that courts have a reason to act in such a way as to abide by 
legitimate expectations by the social group (however defined) and that the social 
group expects courts to act in line with past judicial decisions, consilience might also 
make (3) plausible (even if coherence were not itself valuable).  
Consilience does not rule out the possibility that two rival explanations might 
cover the same explanandum. If that were all there was to the comparative aspect of 
the argument, no tragedy would follow, but the argument would not run, as premise 
(3) in our scheme would not be true of either of the rival (but equally consilient) 
explanatory principles. 
That might not be the end of the story, however. If consilience helps to track 
coherence, perhaps there are other ways in which coherence might influence the 
choice of best explanation. It has been argued, for instance, that coherence between 
the explanation and our background beliefs might also play a relevant role in selecting 
the best explanation. Perhaps this integration relates to substantive normative 
background beliefs. Perhaps, as we saw above, a comparison between competing 
could be settled in ways that go beyond coherence, as we suggested above when 
considering the possibility of a direct moral evaluation of the relative merits of each 
explanation. Consilience does not exhaust the ways to compare the type of 
explanations that are relevant in IBE-Ps, and a complete picture of such criteria 
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cannot be provided here. However that might be, as we have seen above, the criteria 
for selecting the best explanation must be integrated in a story about what makes the 
conditional in (3) plausible. 
 
6. A picture of IBE-P 
Courts use precedents in a variety of ways 51. They apply the ratio decidendi of 
previous cases, distinguish cases, argue by analogy, argue a fortiori, and more. 
Sometimes they argue that there is reason to act in accordance with a principle that is 
not itself part of the ratio decidendi of a previous case and do so by reference to a set 
of established legal rules. Lord Goff did so in Lipkin Gorman, Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue, Lord Denning tried to do so in Bundy. When they do so, courts are often 
cagey about what exactly they are doing: are they inferring the existence of a legal 
norm (the explanatory principle), or perhaps just inferring that there are reasons to act 
according to that principle even if it does not qualify as a legal norm? They are also 
not very clear about what the relationship is between the source rules and the 
principle they believe should be used to guide action. Not surprisingly, they are not 
clear about the strength of their argument. In this paper I argued that these inferences 
take a distinctive form, the inference to the best explanation towards a (legal) 
principle (IBE-P), which possesses similarities to (but not merely a species of) what 
philosophers of science call an inference to the best explanation and tried to explain 
its form, its typical conclusion, the explanatory relationship needed for the argument 
                                                 
51 The immediate puzzle addressed in this article was raised by a particular argumentative move 
sometimes made by British judges (both in England and Scotland) and, accordingly, my account of 
IBE-P is presented by reference to prominent Scottish and English cases. But British judges do not 
have exclusivity in deploying IBE-Ps. Not only it is used by judges operating within other jurisdictions 
(both civil and common law), they are also deployed (mutatis mutantis) by doctrinal scholars trying to 
make sense of legal authoritative materials across many jurisdictions. Regrettably, a demonstration of 
how IBE-Ps are deployed in those contexts cannot be accomplished here.  
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to run, the ways in which its explanandum is construed, and some criteria for 
choosing the best among a number of candidate explanations.  
 
